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Under the educational sorting hypothesis, an environment in which some individuals are constrained from
entering university will be characterized by increased pooling at the high school graduation level, as compared
to an environment with greater university access. This results because some potential high school drop{outs
and university enrollees choose the high school graduate designation in order to take advantage of high ability
individuals who are constrained from entering university. This is in stark contrast to human capital theory
which predicts higher university enrollment, but identical high school drop{out rates in regions with greater
university access. Using NLSYM and NLSYW education data from the late 1960s and early 1970s, I ﬂnd
that labor markets that contain a university have higher high school drop{out rates.
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Within a human capital framework, education augments natural abilities that are
subsequently sold in the labor market. On the other side, supporters of sorting models
argue that education also acts as a signaling or screening device for unobservable ability.
More speci¯cally, ¯rms infer ability from education and students choose an education
level to signal their ability to potential employers. The earnings reward for high school
graduation is therefore the combined e®ect of human capital accumulation as well as the
e®ect of being identi¯ed as graduate rather than a drop{out.
In this paper I develop, and test, a simple signaling model in which some fraction of
the population is constrained1 from entering university. I show that increasing university
access, by expanding the university system and thereby lowering the cost of post{secondary
education, may increase the high school drop{out rate. As some previously constrained,
but relatively high ability, individuals leave the high school graduate group to become
university enrollees the incentive to hide behind the remaining \constrained" high school
graduates is diminished. As a result, the most able \unconstrained" high school graduates
enroll in university and the least able high school graduates drop out of high school. This
is in stark contrast to the human capital model which predicts only an upward movement
in educational attainment.
Despite the importance of the debate surrounding human capital and sorting interpre-
tations, empirical evidence is fairly limited and often unconvincing. The di±culty largely
arises because many of the empirical implications, or predictions, of the basic human cap-
ital and sorting models are similar, or identical. This is not particularly surprising since
the ¯rm and worker decision processes are the same in both models. Firms weigh the pro-
1 The term \constrained" is used throughout this paper to convey the idea that the cost of going to
university is too high for some fraction of the population to pay. Since it is signiﬂcantly cheaper to attend
a local university, \access" is said to be higher in areas that have a university. In other words, the marginal
cost of attending university is much lower for people living in areas with universities, and enrollment is
therefore higher.
1ductivity of workers with di®erent amounts of schooling against the wages they command,
and select the education mix that maximizes pro¯ts. At the same time, workers compare
wages to education costs and choose the schooling level that maximizes wealth (or utility).
To get around this problem, Riley (1979) takes advantage of the fact that within a
sorting framework, extra information about worker productivity reduces the importance of
education as a signal. He divides workers into jobs with and without observable productiv-
ity, and tests whether education is less important in jobs where productivity is observable.
Although Riley's results are consistent with the sorting model, they are also compati-
ble with the view that his two samples simply consist of workers in more and less risky
occupations.
Using a somewhat di®erent approach, Wolpin (1977) estimates separate earnings func-
tions for self{employed and privately employed workers in the NBER{Thorndike sample.
He ¯nds that average schooling is lower among the self{employed, but that education has
a larger impact on their earnings. Since the self{employed enjoy average earnings that
are one{third higher in each of the educational categories, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the amount of schooling required to attain each earnings level is lower for the
self{employed. Wolpin's results provide some support for the sorting hypothesis.
An alternative approach, employed by Lang and Kropp (1986), is to look at the
comparative statics properties of the models. Lang and Kropp consider the e®ect of a
compulsory attendance law in the presence of educational sorting. Under a sorting model,
an increase in the minimum school leaving age will increase the educational attainment
of individuals not directly a®ected by the rule change. A rise in the school leaving age
from s to s + 1 will be accompanied by a decrease in the average ability level of people
with s + 1 years of education. As this happens, the most able people with s +1y e a r so f
education will choose to remain in school for s+2 years and so on. In contrast, under the
human capital model, a change in the minimum schooling age will only alter the behavior
of directly a®ected individuals. Using school enrollment data and compulsory attendance
2laws across U.S. states from 1910-70, Lang and Kropp (1986) show that the enrollment
rates for individuals with schooling levels beyond those directly a®ected by compulsory
attendance laws did in fact rise with minimum leaving age requirements.
Departing from previous work, but following most closely in the spirit of Lang and
Kropp (1986), this paper considers the role that university access2 plays in educational at-
tainment decisions. Within a symmetric information (standard human capital) framework,
local universities and satellite campuses provide lower cost post{secondary alternatives,
and consequently increase university enrollment. While fewer barriers to higher education
(more local universities) will increase university enrollment within an asymmetric informa-
tion (signaling) framework, it might also increase the high school drop{out rate. If fewer
high ability people are constrained from entering university, the high school graduate3
skill pool is reduced, and the incentive to obtain the high school graduate designation is
diminished. The least able graduates will, therefore, become drop{outs and the most able
graduates will enroll in university.
Using National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men (NLSYM) and Young Women
(NLSYW) data for men aged 14-19 in 1966 and women aged 14-19 in 1968, I investigate
the role that university access plays in schooling decisions. This time period is well suited
to this study because there was substantial variation in university access, and the NLSYM
and NLSYW report the presence of a university in the respondent's local labor market.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section sketches a simple theoretical
framework. Section 3 details the empirical approach. Section 4 discusses the NLSYM and
NLSYW data. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Access refers to the presence of a university, and not to admittance.
3 Throughout this paper I use high school drop{out to describe any individual not completing grade 12,
high school graduate to identify any individual who completes high school but does not enter university,
and university enrollee to describe a person with some university training.
32. The Determinants of Degree Choice
2.1. A Simple Asymmetric Information Framework
Consider a simple environment in which ability (µ) is continuously distributed, and
where individuals know their own ability, the distribution of ability, and whether or not
they are constrained from entering university. I initially assume that the probability an
individual is constrained from entering university, 1 ¡ p; is independent of ability.4 The
implications of relaxing this restriction are discussed later in this section. For expositional
convenience, and with no loss of generality, I ignore any human capital accumulation
associated with education.5 Finally, I assume that employers can observe schooling, but
not ability, output, or whether an individual was constrained from entering university,
and therefore pay workers with education level s the average product of group s.I nt h i s
environment, just as in the human capital framework, people choose the education level
that maximizes their lifetime wealth.6
The framework presented in this section is a generalization of the standard signaling
model (Spence 1973 and Stiglitz 1975). The model allows for three schooling choices (s):
drop out of high school (d), graduate from high school (h), or enroll in university (u),
and schooling costs (Cs(µ)) that are decreasing in ability and increasing in educational
designation.7
Within this framework, there will be a separating equilibrium with three distinct
4 With imperfect capital markets, a student might be constrained from entering university if he does
not live near a university, and his parents lack the ﬂnancial resources to board him at an out of town
school. This description is clearly more strong than it needs to be, university participation will obviously
be higher in areas that have a university since the marginal cost of attending university is substantially
lower if you can live with your parents while in school. In other words, some fraction of the population
will choose to attend university even if expensive private, or distant universities are the only option, while
another proportion of the population will choose to attend only if a university exists in their local area.
5 The notation also blurs all lifecycle wage components, but µ can be viewed as the discounted value
of lifetime ability.
6 Wealth is deﬂned as discounted lifetime wages less the cost of education.
7 Education costs must be paid in order; a university enrollee must pay the high school graduation
cost as well as the university enrollment cost.
4education groups, and cuto® points for group membership at µH and µU,a sl o n ga st h e
cost structure is such that:
E(µjµ<µ H)=Á ( µ )¡C h( µ H)
E ( µ j µ¸µ U)=Á ( µ )+C u( µ U)
where Á(µ)=
[ F( ￿ U) ¡ F( ￿ H)]E(￿j￿H￿￿<￿U)+(1¡p)[1¡F(￿U)]E(￿j￿‚￿U)
[F(￿U)¡F(￿H)]+(1¡p)[1¡F(￿U)] ;F () denotes the cumula-
tive density function, and f() denotes the probability density function. Notice that this is
a non{standard separating equilibrium since the high school graduate group will contain
people with ability in excess of µU who are constrained from entering university.
Since there is a continuum of ability types, and educational costs are decreasing in
ability, satisfying the break{point conditions speci¯ed above is su±cient to ensure a sep-
arating equilibrium. Although the assumption of a separating equilibrium is somewhat
restrictive, and Spence (1974) shows that Nash behavior is not su±cient to rule out pool-
ing, empirical evidence clearly proves that any model that does not give rise to some sorting
can be rejected.8
Proposition: If we begin in a separating equilibrium, greater university access will be
associated with both higher university enrollment rates and higher high school drop{out
rates.
Proof: Totally di®erentiating the equilibrium conditions,
°HdµH = ÁUdµU + Ápdp
°UdµU = ÁHdµH + Ápdp
where Ái for i = H;U; and p; denote the partial derivatives of Á(µ) with respect to µH;µ U;
and p; °H =
@E(￿j￿<￿H)
@￿H ¡ ÁH +
@Ch(￿H)
@￿H and °U =
@E(￿j￿‚￿U)
@￿U ¡ ÁU ¡
@Cu(￿U)
@￿U : Solving
8 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and Riley (1979) prove that a Nash equilibrium might not exist if the
concentration of low ability types is too low, but Riley (1985) and Dickens and Lang (1985) show that this













Signing the total derivatives simply requires signing the partial derivatives. ÁH is
clearly positive since shifting µH to the right, holding all else constant, increases the high
school graduate skill pool. Similarily, a straight decrease in the proportion of the popu-
lation that is constrained (an increase in p; holding all else constant) leads to an exodus
of high ability high school graduates to the university enrollee group and therefore lowers




when µU is held constant. Similarily, °U < 0 because d￿U
dp =
`p
￿U < 0w h e nµ H is held




@￿H is therefore su±cient to ensure
that d￿U
dp < 0a n dd￿H
dp > 0:
The ¯rst restriction, ÁU > 0; ensures that the movement of the most able uncon-
strained individuals from the high school graduate group to the university enrollee group
has a negative impact on the high school graduate skill pool. Stated somewhat di®erently,
the proportion of the population that is constrained, must not be so large as to swamp the





@￿H ; ensures that the drop{out group is of su±cient
size and that the density does not rise too steeply.
The intuition behind the proposition is very simple. The movement of previously con-
strained individuals with skills above µU into the university enrollee group, as constraints
fall, reduces the high school graduate skill pool and encourages the most able previously
unconstrained graduates to enter university as well. In other words, µU must fall or re-
main unchanged. Similarily, the reduced high school graduate skill pool encourages the
least able graduates to become drop{outs, and µH therefore rises. The net result is an
abandoning of the middle; more university enrollees and more high school drop{outs.
The changing education choices are particularly easy to see diagramatically. For
6illustrative purposes, suppose that skills are uniformly distributed and that we begin in
a separating equilibrium with cuto®s for education group membership at µH and µU.
Individuals in the darkly shaded areas of Figure 1 are free to choose any level of education,
while people in the unshaded and lightly shaded regions are constrained from entering
university. People below µH choose the drop{out designation and people between µH and
µU choose to be graduates. It is the people above µU that make this a non{standard
equilibrium; the people in rectangle A enter university but those in rectangles B and C
are constrained from doings so and are therefore forced to leave school at high school
graduation. This of course means that the graduate skill pool is substantially greater than
would otherwise be the case.
Now consider an increase in university access, or an increase in p: T h ep e o p l ei nb o t h
the lightly and darkly shaded regions of Figure 1 are now free to choose any education
level. As a result, the people in rectangle B become university enrollees and thereby reduce
the graduate skill pool. This in turn induces the most able, and unconstrained, graduates
to enroll in university and the least able graduates to become drop{outs. In other words,
the cuto®s for education group membership (µ0
H and µ0
U)s h i f ti n w a r d .
The analysis is slightly more complicated if the probability of constraint is a function
of ability, 1-p(µ): However, as long as the probability of constraint is a decreasing function
of ability and is non{zero for the most able, both before and after the constraint is eased,










where g(µ) <f( µ ) for all µ and g0(µ) > 0: In fact, a multiplicative increase in g(µ)l e a d st o
an even greater increase in the high school drop{out rate, as compared to the independent
p case, because the high school skill pool is depleted to an even greater degree.9
9 If, however, the probability of constraint is zero for the most able k% of the population, the high
school drop{out rate will increase if, and only if the mean high school graduate skill level (holding the
7Assuming that all ability types have some probability of constraint, an increase in
university enrollment that results from better university access comes from two sources:
previously constrained and previously unconstrained people. Access therefore has an am-
biguous e®ect on the university enrollee skill mean. While the previously unconstrained
people moving into the university enrollee group are less able than the university enrollees
they are joining, the mean skill level of previously constrained movers depends on the form
of probability of constraint and educational cost functions.10 Conversely, as access rises,
those choosing to move from the high school graduate group to the drop{out group are
more skilled than the initial high school drop{outs, and hence raise the average skill level.
Given the exodus of both the most and least gifted high school graduates, the impact on
t h eg r a d u a t es k i l lm e a ni sa m b i g u o u s .
It might appear that high school drop{outs in high access regions have an incentive
to graduate from high school and then look for work in low access areas where high school
graduates are more highly paid. There are a couple of points that one should bear in mind.
Firstly, employers can observe the institution from which a job applicant graduated. If
there are di®erences between `locals' and `non{locals' he can use this information to sort
workers. Secondly, if students in high access regions take the behavior of students in low
access areas into account when choosing an education level, fewer people will drop{out of
high school in these regions than if they fail incorporate this information. The drop{out
estimates presented in this paper might therefore be viewed as a lower bound.
2.2. The Standard Symmetric Information Framework
The predictions of a standard, symmetric information, human capital model di®er
substantially. Within in this framework, reducing the barriers to higher education will
drop{out/graduate cut point constant) falls. In other words, the drop{out rate will rise if the movement
of newly unconstrained people into the university enrollee group is not oﬁ{set by an exodus of previously
unconstrained university enrollees into the graduate group.
10 If the probability of constraint is independent of ability, increased access will clearly decrease the
skill mean.
8increase university enrollment, but will have no impact on the high school drop{out rate.
An increase in access to local universities will bring the cost of higher education within
range for some proportion of previously constrained individuals, and thereby encourage
higher university enrollment. It will not, however, have any impact on the high school
drop{out rate, or the university enrollment rate of unconstrained people.
It might seem that university access rate di®erences might alter the number of people
in each education category, and thus the return to a speci¯c degree. However, since regions
are relatively small, there is a free °ow of goods across regions, and we are concerned
with the variation in access at a point in time, the return to education will be the same
across regions under the human capital hypothesis. Even if goods and factors do not
move perfectly, Lang and Kropp (1986) show that changes in school policy will not have a
signi¯cant impact on people not directly a®ected by the policy.11
In contrast to the skill pool predictions of the signaling model, the human capital
model predicts a decrease in the mean skill level of high school graduates, no change
for high school drop{outs and an ambiguous change for university enrollees. The high
school drop{out skill mean is unchanged since there is no entry or exit. Conversely, higher
access decreases the graduate skill pool by encouraging the most able graduates to become
university enrollees. Finally, access has no impact on the university skill mean if the
probability of constraint is independent of ability, but more generally, it depends on the
form of the probability of constraint and educational cost functions.
3. Empirical Implementation
The models presented in Section 2 o®er two speci¯c testable predictions that di®er
across signaling and human capital models.12 Firstly, the signaling model predicts a higher
11 The analysis presented in this paper uses local labor market (based on 1966 county deﬂnitions) data,
whereas Lang and Kropp (1986) use state level data. It is even less likely that diﬁerences in educational
category sizes would give rise to diﬁerences in the return to schooling levels across local labor markets.
12 Or more precisely, two alternatives ways to test the same prediction.
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44Since there is no a priori reason to restrict university access to have the same impact on
both cut points, all regressions reported in this paper use the ¯rst speci¯cation (equation
(2)). However, it turns out that all of the results presented in this paper are similar if
model (3) is used in place of model (2). Further, a likelihood ratio test rejects the standard
ordered probit, with no university access measure in X; i nf a v o ro fe i t h e rs p e c i ¯ c a t i o n( 2 )
or (3) with p-values of less than 0.01 under most sampling rules and access de¯nitions (all
p-values are reported in tables A1-A4).
3.2. The Skill Level within Education Groups
The NLSYM and NLSYW include the respondents score on the Knowledge of the
World of Work test, which has been used by both Card (1993) and Griliches (1977) as a
measure of ability.15 Using this information it is possible to examine how the mean test
score of the three education groups varies across university access.
KWWis = ®0 + ®1Ais + Zis®2s + ºis (4)
where Z is a vector of family background and individual characteristics and s denotes
education group.
4. Data
The data used in this paper are drawn from the National Longitudinal Surveys of
Young Men (NLSYM) and Young Women (NLSYW). The NLSYM began in 1966 with
5225 men aged 14-24 and continued with follow{up surveys through 1981. The NLSYW
began in 1968 with 5159 women aged 14-24 and continued through 1993. As the primary
variable of interest (access to a local university) is only reported in the base year, I limit the
sample to individuals aged 14-19 in the base year in order to measure access as accurately
as possible. Restricting the sample in this manner is important for two related reasons.
Firstly, the rapid expansion of the university system during the 60s and 70s might lead
15 The weaknesses of this measure are discussed in the next section.
12to signi¯cant measurement error if the access measure refers to access 6 or 8 years after
schooling decisions are made. Secondly, university access information was only collected in
1966 (1968), for the labor market of residence in that year. This data is therefore less likely
to correspond to the labor market of residence when educational decisions were made the
older the individual was in 1966 (1968). Restricting the sample in this manner leaves 3496
men and 2957 women. Some descriptive statistics for the entire sample, and the subsample
with valid parental education information, are presented in Table 1.
Years of education is de¯ned as the highest grade completed in any survey year, so
a person who does not report years education in 1981, but reported 14 years in 1980,
is is assigned 14 years of schooling.16 This method of measuring years of education is
used to mitigate the problem of missing observations. However, I am interested in initial
education decisions, and not the decision to return to school later in life, an individual
must therefore complete grade 12 by age 20 to be considered a high school graduate17 and
enter university by age 22 to be considered a university enrollee. The average man has 13.3
years education while the average woman has only 13.0. The male/female education gap
is largely due to university participation di®erences; 47% of men, but only 33% of women
attended university.
In the 1966 (1968) baseline interview, respondents were asked numerous family back-
ground questions. Individuals were asked their mother's and father's years of education,
unfortunately a relatively large fraction (approximately 15%) of the sample have missing
values for these variables.18 The respondents were also asked if either parent was an immi-
grant; 4.5% and 4.1% of men report and immigrant father and mother respectively while
16 I exclude individuals who do not complete grade ten because it is unclear how they arrived at
educational decisions.
17 This deﬂnition also reduces the probability of mixing high school graduates who completed their
education at a high school and people receiving high school equivalency diplomas.
18 I use two approaches to deal with this problem, I run all regressions with the complete data set assign-
ing mean fathers’ and mothers’ education to those with missing values (and include dummies too indicate
imputed data) as well as simply excluding people who do not report parental education information.
13the respective rates for women are 3.7% and 3.3%. Family status at age 14 is also reported
in both surveys; 88% of men and 81% women lived with both parents at age 14.
The baseline survey also asked a series of questions about the respondent's local
labor market. The Census Division (CD) of residence and community size (city, suburb,
or rural) are reported for all individuals. Most importantly, the NLSYM and NLSYW
report on the existence of several types of post-secondary educational institutions in the
respondent's local labor market. In order to check the robustness of the estimates to the
access de¯nition, I de¯ne four di®erent access measures and report all estimates under each
of the four de¯nitions. Access is de¯ned as the presence of: a four year degree granting
institution, a two or four year degree granting institution, a public four year degree granting
institution, and a public two or four year degree granting institution. There is substantial
variation in university access, 70% of men and 67% of women lived a labor market that
contained a four year university. However, access rates did vary across CDs. In the East
South Central Division 41% of men and 51% of women had access to a four year university,
whereas 91% of men and 87% of women had similar access in the Middle Atlantic Division
(see Table 2 for more detail).
Finally, the baseline data also includes the Knowledge of the World of Work (KWW)
and IQ test scores. Unfortunately, the IQ test instrument di®ered across schools and states.
All analysis presented in this paper is therefore restricted to the KWW test which was
administered to all respondents in the base year of the survey. The male version of this test
consists of 28 questions about job activities in ten occupations, the educational require-
ments for these occupations, an the relative earnings of eight di®erent paired occupations.
The KWW test administered to women was a shorter version of the same test.
Although I report the results for the KWW scores by education group, a better abil-
ity measure, such as an IQ score from a standardized test instrument, would clearly be
preferable. Given the weakness of the KWW as an ability measure, the results presented
in section 5.2 should be viewed as suggestive rather than conclusive.
145. Results
5.1. Educational Attainment
Before turning to the formal analysis, it is helpful to compare the distribution of edu-
cational attainment for individuals living in labor markets with and without a university.
Figures 2 and 3, as well as Table 3, report the percentage of people in each education
group across university access levels. Both men and women are more likely to drop out of
high school or go on to university in labor markets that contain a university. If access is
de¯ned as the presence of a four year degree granting institution, 20.6% of men and 19.1%
of women drop out of high school in labor markets without access compared to 22.0% and
19.9% respectively in regions with access. The gap between drop{out rates in high and low
access regions is larger when access is de¯ned as the presence of a two or four year degree
granting institution. Under this de¯nition, 19.8% of men and 15.3% of women drop out
in regions without access compared to 22.0% of men and 20.8% of women in labor mar-
kets with access. Of course, family and personal characteristic di®erences may be driving
these results. The remainder of this section therefore focuses on more formally exploring
the role that university access plays in determining educational decisions, holding family
background and personal characteristics constant.
Tables A1-A4 report the ordered probit estimates using speci¯cation (2). All regres-
sions include dummy variables indicating residence in a city in 1966 (1968), residence in a
suburb in 1966 (1968), race being black, immigrant father, immigrant mother, household
subscribed to a newspaper when the respondent was 14 years of age, someone in the house-
hold had a library card when respondent was 14, and eight indicators for census division
of residence in the base year, as well as father's and mother's years of education and the
number of siblings. To check the robustness of the estimates to sample de¯nitions, all
regressions are run using two sampling criteria: including and excluding observations with
missing parental education data.19
19 The results are generally robust to this sampling restriction. The estimates for the sample restricted
15The coe±cient estimates, presented in Tables A1-A4, generally have the expected
signs. Parental education, the presence of a newspaper in the home, and access to a
library card, all have a positive impact on the probability that an individual stays in school
longer. Conversely, family size and residence in an inner city increase the probability that
an individual will leave school earlier.
Most importantly, the coe±cient on university access is positive for the lower cut point
and negative for the upper cut point under all access measures and sampling rules.20 In
other words, university access increases the probability that and individual will choose to
be a high school drop{out or a university enrollee (also see Table 4). The predicted high
school drop{out rate in labor markets with access ranges from 1.2% to 6.0% higher for
men and from 4.7% to 31.4% higher for women compared to labor markets without access,
depending on the access de¯nition.
The impact and statistical signi¯cance of access in the drop{out/graduate cut point
di®ers across access measures for men and women. This likely re°ects di®erences in pro-
gram/degree preferences between men and women during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Training for `good' female jobs, such as nursing, teaching, and more technical o±ce jobs
were more likely to take place at two year colleges and public universities. Therefore, it is
not surprising that the female estimates are more sensitive to the de¯nition of access.
One might also wish to control for ability. Adding the KWW score to the independent
variable list does not substantially alter any of the results. The statistical signi¯cance of
all coe±cients are largely unchanged, as are coe±cient magnitudes and the probabilities
of opting for various education groups.
To check that model speci¯cation is not driving the results I also run all regressions
using speci¯cation (3). The estimates, including the access measure coe±cients, and the
predicted educational group sizes are similar in all cases. Further, the °avor of the results
to respondents with full parental education data are therefore reported in the appendix.
20 The access measure in the drop{out/graduate cut point is signiﬂcant at better than the 5% level
under most access measures and sampling rules. See Tables 4, A1-A4, and A6, for more detail.
16are also very similar using a standard probit model, with the two education choices being
drop{out of high school or high school graduation and beyond.
Finally, to check that macroeconomic factors are not driving the results, I also estimate
the model by two and three year age groups. Again the results are very similar, although
t h ee s t i m a t e sa r eq u i t ei m p r e c i s ei ns o m ec a s e sb e c a u s et h es a m p l e sb e c o m er a t h e rs m a l l .
5.2. The Skill Level within Education Groups
The simple signaling model presented in section 2 predicts that the skill pool will be
greater among high school drop{outs in labor markets with university access, as compared
to labor markets without access. Although the high school graduate and university enrollee
skill pool predictions are in general ambiguous, one might expect the graduate skill pool
should fall since the results presented in the previous section show that the university
enrollment rate increases by more than the high school drop{out rate as access rises. It is
important to remember, however, that only the drop{out ability prediction of the signaling
model contradicts the human capital model.
Table 5 presents the average KWW test score di®erential for regions with and without
access, controlling for all observable factors under all four sampling rules. 21 Controlling
for family background and observable characteristics, the average score for a male drop{
out is approximately 2% higher in regions with university access. In contrast, there is no
statistically signi¯cant relationship between university access and KWW scores for women
in any education group. The di®erence between the male and female versions of the KWW
test instrument is the most likely explanation for this result. The female test instrument
is very coarse; it consists of only 10 questions, while the male version has 28.
It is also important to point out that these results are sensitive to sample de¯nitions.
In general, there is no statistically signi¯cant di®erence in KWW scores across univer-
21 Table A7 reports the regression results for equation (4) with access deﬂned as the presence of a four
year degree granting institution for the full sample. The estimates for the other access measures and
sample deﬂnitions are very similar, and are therefore not reported in full detail.
17sity access levels for high school drop{outs when the observations with missing parental
education data are excluded. Small sample sizes are most likely driving this result.
6. Discussion
The results presented in this paper suggest that signaling played an important role
in educational decisions during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In regions where it was
possible to take advantage of constrained individuals, a signi¯cant number of individuals
appear to have done so. More precisely, people living in labor markets that did not contain
a university were less likely to attend university and less likely to drop{out of high school.
While these results are consistent with a signaling story, they are not consistent with a
pure human capital model.
Although fewer people are constrained from entering university today than twenty
years ago, there remain individuals who are unable to attend university due to geographic or
¯nancial barriers. Coming at this from a somewhat di®erent perspective, many European
countries use selective education systems that e®ectively bar a large percentage of the
population from entering university. Although a human capital model clearly predicts
that these types of rigidities, or constraints, in°uence the choice set of individuals directly
a®ected, the results presented in this paper suggest that they might also in°uence the
decisions of people not directly a®ected.
Further, as it becomes easier for more able individuals to distinguish themselves from
less able individuals, wages become more meritocratic. In other words, as constraints de-
cline, or higher education becomes more accessible, wages more closely re°ect productivity.
This is an important ¯nding for social policy. Although increased university access is often
touted as part of the prescription to improve the lives of the `less' fortunate, the results
presented in this paper suggest that increased university access might increase education
and wage dispersion, and lead to a decline in the relative position of the less able.
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Drop-outs Graduates University Enrollees
Female Education Choices by University Access 
(including only 4 year institutions)
No Local University
University in Local AreaTable 1. Summary of Sample Characteristics
                       Men                    Women
Full Restricted Full Restricted
Sample Sample Sample Sample
Age Distribution (%)*
14-15 37.2 37.7 28.7 29.7
16-17 36.9 37.0 36.5 36.5
18-19 25.9 25.3 34.8 33.8
Regional Distribution (%)*
Northeast 20.5 21.6 19.9 21.0
Midwest 26.5 27.9 28.2 29.2
South 39.9 36.8 38.3 35.7
West 13.1 13.7 13.6 14.1
Residence in (%)*
Inner-City 33.9 31.0 35.9 31.7
Suburb 32.4 36.1 30.2 33.3
Rural 33.7 32.9 33.9 35.0
University Access in Local Area      
4 year university 69.9 70.3 66.5 66.3
2 or 4 year university 80.6 79.9 77.5 76.6
4 year public university 51.8 51.8 47.9 47.3
2 or 4 year public university 61.6 60.6 58.0 56.3
Family Structure at Age 14 (%)
Mother and Father 83.8 95.1 77.5 95.1
Average Parental Education
Mother's Education 10.6 10.7 10.7 10.9
Father's Education 10.3 10.4 10.6 10.5
Black (%) 29.3 20.2 29.1 22.0
Newspaper at Age 14 87.0 90.5 86.1 89.3
Library Card at Age 14 70.2 73.5 72.0 75.2
Father is an Immigrant 3.9 4.0 3.0 3.3
Mother is an Immigrant 3.5 3.6 2.7 2.8
Average Number of Siblings 3.4 3.2 3.6 3.5
Average Score on KWW Test (%) 59.4 60.7 70.7 72.3
Mean Years of Education 13.3 13.5 13.0 13.2
High School Graduates (%) 78.4 82.5 80.4 84.3
Some College (%) 47.2 52.1 32.6 36.5
Sample Size 3203 2451 2693 2045
* In 1966 for men and 1968 women.  Restricted samples include only respondents who report 
parental education levels.Table 2. Percent of Sample Living in a Labor Market With A University of the Specified Type
             Men             Women
  4 Year 2 or 4 4 Year 2 or 4 4 Year 2 or 4 4 Year 2 or 4
Year Public Year Year Public Year
Public Public
New England 84.3 84.3 57.0 57.0 83.8 83.8 53.5 53.5
Middle Atlantic 90.8 92.0 73.6 75.3 86.7 88.1 71.6 73.0
East North Central 76.3 85.7 53.0 66.8 71.4 79.8 45.1 58.7
West North Central 64.4 64.4 55.3 55.8 52.9 60.5 45.3 52.5
South Atlantic 60.2 73.8 39.5 45.8 54.5 70.9 30.3 37.7
East South Central 40.8 84.2 26.5 67.7 51.4 85.4 32.1 68.4
West South Central 55.5 65.8 33.3 40.4 57.7 69.6 40.4 49.2
Mountain 64.2 64.2 39.0 39.0 65.0 65.0 40.2 40.2
Pacific 82.2 92.3 78.8 90.2 74.1 87.0 71.9 85.2  
 Table 3. Percent of Sample in each Educational Category
                             Men                         Women
Education Regions Regions Regions Regions
Groups Without Access With Access Without Access With Access
Access is defined as a 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 20.6 22.0 19.1 19.9
High School Graduates 36.5 28.4 51.9 45.7
University Enrollees 42.8 49.6 29.0 34.4         
Access is defined as a 2 or 4 year degree granting institution            
High School Drop-outs 19.8 22.0 15.3 20.8
High School Graduates 37.0 29.4 55.2 45.6
University Enrollees 43.2 48.6 29.5 33.6
Access is defined as a public 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 21.0 22.0 18.8 20.5
High School Graduates 34.3 27.7 51.0 44.3
University Enrollees 44.7 48.6 30.3 35.2         
Access is defined as a public 2 or 4 year degree granting institution           
High School Drop-outs 20.5 22.3 17.3 21.3
High School Graduates 34.6 28.5 52.2 44.5
University Enrollees 44.9 49.2 30.5 34.2Table 4. Predicted Educational Group Sizes
                             Men                         Women
Education Regions Regions Regions Regions
Groups Without Access With Access Without Access With Access
Access is defined as a 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 18.6 * 19.6 17.2 17.5
High School Graduates 35.9 28.3 51.6 45.8
University Enrollees 45.5 52.1 31.2 36.7         
Access is defined as a 2 or 4 year degree granting institution            
High School Drop-outs 18.0 19.6 14.0 *** 18.4
High School Graduates 36.5 29.2 54.6 45.7
University Enrollees 45.5 51.2 31.4 35.9
Access is defined as a public 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 18.9 ** 19.7 17.0 *** 17.8
High School Graduates 33.8 27.5 50.3 44.9
University Enrollees 47.3 52.8 32.7 37.3         
Access is defined as a public 2 or 4 year degree granting institution           
High School Drop-outs 18.5 ** 19.8 15.8 *** 18.5
High School Graduates 34.2 28.3 51.5 45.0
University Enrollees 47.3 51.9 32.7 36.5
The access measure in the drop-out/graduate cut point is positive and significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level.Table 5. Mean Percentage Difference in KWW Scores between Labor Markets With and Without a University 
                             Men                         Women
  Full Sample Restricted Full Sample Restricted
   Sample  Sample
Access is defined as a 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-Outs 2.1 * 0.8 1.1 2.6
High School Graduates -0.9 -1.0 0.9 1.4
University Enrollees 1.1 0.6 0.4 -0.1  
Access is defined as a 2 or 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-Outs 3.6 *** 3.6 ** -0.4 -0.4
High School Graduates -0.7 -0.6 -0.9 -0.1
University Enrollees -0.2 -0.7 1.9 1.5
Access is defined as a public 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-Outs 1.9 * 1.0 2.2 4.4 *
High School Graduates -0.1 -0.4  1.2 1.5
University Enrollees 1.8 *** 1.7 ** 1.0 0.4  
Access is defined as a public 2 or 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-Outs 0.8 0.4 2.0 4.6 *
High School Graduates -0.7 -1.0 -0.9 -0.2
University Enrollees 0.6 0.5 0.8 -0.2  
The difference between mean test scores across university access is significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level.Table A1. Ordered Probit Estimates (Spec. 2) 
                Men             Women
Access Measure                4 Year          Public 4 Year                4 Year          Public 4 Year
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
 
Father's Education 0.0633 0.0082 0.0636 0.0082 0.0633 0.0090 0.0637 0.0091
Mother's Education 0.0725 0.0095 0.0723 0.0095 0.0915 0.0104 0.0911 0.0104
Immigrant Father 0.3579 0.1307 0.3578 0.1307 0.5262 0.1521 0.5254 0.1519
Immigrant Mother 0.2960 0.1392 0.3011 0.1390 0.1884 0.1561 0.1957 0.1561
Black Indicator -0.0644 0.0582 -0.0590 0.0584 0.1002 0.0634 0.1086 0.0636
Number of Siblings -0.0273 0.0090 -0.0272 0.0090 -0.0261 0.0099 -0.0265 0.0099
Newspaper* 0.3419 0.0680 0.3422 0.0680 0.3173 0.0725 0.3204 0.0725
Library Card* 0.2343 0.0505 0.2394 0.0505 0.1258 0.0556 0.1306 0.0556
Mom and Dad* 0.1757 0.0675 0.1746 0.0674 0.1951 0.0788 0.1906 0.0789
City -0.2623 0.0609 -0.2441 0.0588 -0.2070 0.0638 -0.1708 0.0610
Suburb -0.0989 0.0594 -0.0846 0.0576 -0.1147 0.0616 -0.0909 0.0604
Drop/Grad Cut Point
Kappa H 0.7892 0.1534 0.8031 0.1509 0.8676 0.1712 0.8489 0.1680
University Access 0.1068 0.0641 0.1318 0.0575 0.0762 0.0681 0.1627 0.0630
Grad/Univ Cut Point
Kappa U 1.9287 0.1549 1.8793 0.1527 2.4915 0.1748 2.4330 0.1718
University Access -0.1322 0.0576 -0.0677 0.0514 -0.1270 0.0626 -0.0368 0.0576
Log-Likelihood -3018  -3019   -2512  -2512  
N 3203  3203   2693  2693  
LR (2) vrs (1): p-value 0.0002 0.0009 0.0144 0.0078
LR (3) vrs (1): p-value 0.0000 0.0002 0.0048 0.0031
* These variables are household attributes at age 14.  All models also include 8 Census Division of residence at 14
dummy variables and 2 dummy variables indicating missing parental education data.Table A2. Ordered Probit Estimates (Spec. 2) 
                Men             Women
Access Measure             2 or 4 Year       Public 2 or 4 Year             2 or 4 Year       Public 2 or 4 Year
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
 
Father's Education 0.0632 0.0082 0.0634 0.0082 0.0634 0.0090 0.0634 0.0090
Mother's Education 0.0723 0.0095 0.0725 0.0095 0.0912 0.0104 0.0914 0.0104
Immigrant Father 0.3617 0.1306 0.3633 0.1306 0.5261 0.1520 0.5272 0.1521
Immigrant Mother 0.2947 0.1392 0.2977 0.1390 0.1918 0.1561 0.1923 0.1561
Black Indicator -0.0663 0.0582 -0.0621 0.0583 0.1052 0.0637 0.1091 0.0637
Number of Siblings -0.0277 0.0090 -0.0275 0.0090 -0.0264 0.0099 -0.0258 0.0099
Newspaper* 0.3411 0.0680 0.3404 0.0680 0.3156 0.0725 0.3185 0.0725
Library Card* 0.2348 0.0505 0.2387 0.0505 0.1285 0.0556 0.1307 0.0557
Mom and Dad* 0.1757 0.0675 0.1722 0.0674 0.1937 0.0788 0.1913 0.0788
City -0.2553 0.0585 -0.2462 0.0588 -0.1848 0.0617 -0.1683 0.0616
Suburb -0.0906 0.0575 -0.0850 0.0571 -0.0985 0.0609 -0.0918 0.0602
Drop/Grad Cut Point
Kappa H 0.7677 0.1564 0.7892 0.1520 0.7559 0.1748 0.8229 0.1687
University Access 0.1142 0.0715 0.1248 0.0592 0.2127 0.0774 0.1851 0.0650   
Grad/Univ Cut Point
Kappa U 1.9348 0.1568 1.8873 0.1533 2.5188 0.1771 2.4561 0.1722
University Access -0.1264 0.0632 -0.0772 0.0525 -0.1375 0.0686 -0.0621 0.0586
     
Log-Likelihood -3020 -3020  -2507   -2509  
N 3203 3203  2693   2693  
LR (2) vrs (1): p-value 0.0018 0.0012 0.0001 0.0011
LR (3) vrs (1): p-value 0.0005 0.0002 0.0000 0.0003
* These variables are household attributes at age 14.  All models also include 8 Census Division of residence at 14
dummy variables and 2 dummy variables indicating missing parental education data.Table A3. Ordered Probit Estimates (Spec. 2) - Restricted to Respondents with Full Parental Education Data
                Men             Women
Access Measure                4 Year          Public 4 Year                4 Year          Public 4 Year
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
 
Father's Education 0.0696 0.0090 0.0700 0.0090 0.0761 0.0101 0.0760 0.0101
Mother's Education 0.0689 0.0111 0.0687 0.0111 0.0839 0.0125 0.0836 0.0125
Immigrant Father 0.3399 0.1481 0.3350 0.1480 0.5726 0.1702 0.5675 0.1699
Immigrant Mother 0.2523 0.1559 0.2589 0.1557 0.2890 0.1780 0.2932 0.1779
Black Indicator 0.0357 0.0695 0.0404 0.0697 0.2411 0.0789 0.2464 0.0792
Number of Siblings -0.0391 0.0110 -0.0391 0.0110 -0.0204 0.0118 -0.0204 0.0118
Newspaper* 0.2458 0.0877 0.2426 0.0876 0.2881 0.0931 0.2902 0.0931
Library Card* 0.2268 0.0593 0.2300 0.0593 0.1545 0.0666 0.1570 0.0668
Mom and Dad* 0.3377 0.1081 0.3360 0.1080 0.3162 0.1181 0.3122 0.1183
City -0.2244 0.0711 -0.2064 0.0690 -0.2355 0.0751 -0.2035 0.0719
Suburb -0.1139 0.0671 -0.1005 0.0652 -0.1535 0.0697 -0.1343 0.0682
Drop/Grad Cut Point   
Kappa H 0.7581 0.1905 0.7820 0.1879 1.0196 0.2109 1.0038 0.2072
University Access 0.1410 0.0764 0.1534 0.0681 0.0609 0.0817 0.1288 0.0761
Grad/Univ Cut Point      
Kappa U 1.9422 0.1923 1.8913 0.1900 2.7050 0.2152 2.6453 0.2119
University Access -0.1187 0.0657 -0.0550 0.0584 -0.1732 0.0712 -0.1106 0.0656
Log-Likelihood -2235 -2236  -1864   -1864  
N 2451 2451  2045   2045  
LR (2) vrs (1): p-value 0.0010 0.0042 0.0107 0.0097
LR (3) vrs (1): p-value 0.0002 0.0010 0.0028 0.0059
* These variables are household attributes at age 14.  All models also include 8 Census Division of residence at 14
dummy variables.Table A4. Ordered Probit Estimates (Spec. 2) - Restricted to Respondents with Full Parental Education Data
                Men             Women
Access Measure             2 or 4 Year       Public 2 or 4 Year             2 or 4 Year       Public 2 or 4 Year
Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error Coeff. St. Error
 
Father's Education 0.0693 0.0090 0.0696 0.0090 0.0761 0.0101 0.0759 0.0101
Mother's Education 0.0689 0.0111 0.0690 0.0111 0.0834 0.0125 0.0837 0.0125
Immigrant Father 0.3423 0.1479 0.3426 0.1479 0.5693 0.1700 0.5718 0.1701
Immigrant Mother 0.2538 0.1557 0.2564 0.1556 0.2975 0.1778 0.2939 0.1779
Black Indicator 0.0356 0.0695 0.0369 0.0696 0.2454 0.0792 0.2507 0.0791
Number of Siblings -0.0395 0.0110 -0.0393 0.0110 -0.0206 0.0118 -0.0198 0.0118
Newspaper* 0.2393 0.0876 0.2375 0.0876 0.2891 0.0931 0.2927 0.0932
Library Card* 0.2279 0.0592 0.2295 0.0592 0.1569 0.0666 0.1605 0.0668
Mom and Dad* 0.3361 0.1081 0.3342 0.1079 0.3108 0.1182 0.3086 0.1183
City -0.2169 0.0686 -0.2076 0.0690 -0.2032 0.0724 -0.1866 0.0722
Suburb -0.1045 0.0650 -0.1003 0.0647 -0.1298 0.0686 -0.1226 0.0678
Drop/Grad Cut Point
Kappa H 0.7623 0.1933 0.7818 0.1891 0.9116 0.2151 0.9559 0.2080
University Access 0.1072 0.0829 0.1174 0.0694 0.1894 0.0908 0.2006 0.0771
Grad/Univ Cut Point
Kappa U 1.9045 0.1934 1.8790 0.1906 2.7006 0.2172 2.6509 0.2123
University Access -0.0696 0.0705 -0.0405 0.0590 -0.1459 0.0767 -0.0922 0.0659
Log-Likelihood -2239  -2239   -1863  -1862  
N 2451  2451   2045  2045  
LR (2) vrs (1): p-value 0.0840  0.0506   0.0024  0.0013  
LR (3) vrs (1): p-value 0.0262  0.0151   0.0005  0.0003  
* These variables are household attributes at age 14.  All models also include 8 Census Division of residence at 14
dummy variables.Table A5. Percent of Sample in each Educational Category - Restricted 
to Respondents with Full Parental Education Data
                             Men                         Women
Education Regions Regions Regions Regions
Groups Without Access With Access Without Access With Access
Access is defined as a 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 16.6 17.9 16.0 15.6
High School Graduates 36.2 27.9 52.7 45.3
University Enrollees 47.2 54.2 31.3 39.1         
Access is defined as a 2 or 4 year degree granting institution            
High School Drop-outs 17.0 17.6 13.2 16.5
High School Graduates 35.1 29.2 55.0 45.5
University Enrollees 47.9 53.2 31.8 38.0
Access is defined as a public 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 17.3 17.7 16.0 15.4
High School Graduates 33.8 27.2 51.8 43.3
University Enrollees 48.9 55.1 32.2 41.3         
Access is defined as a public 2 or 4 year degree granting institution           
High School Drop-outs 17.4 17.6 14.4 16.7
High School Graduates 33.3 28.5 53.2 43.6
University Enrollees 49.3 53.9 32.4 39.7Table A6. Predicted Educational Group Sizes - Restricted to Respondents with Full Parental Education Data
                              Men                           Women
Education Regions Regions Regions Regions
Groups Without Access With Access Without Access With Access
Access is defined as a 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 16.7 ** 17.7 16.0 15.5
High School Graduates 35.9 27.9 52.5 45.1
University Enrollees 47.4 54.4 31.5 39.4         
Access is defined as a 2 or 4 year degree granting institution            
High School Drop-outs 17.0 17.6 13.1 * 15.4
High School Graduates 34.8 29.1 49.6 40.6
University Enrollees 48.2 53.3 37.3 44.0
Access is defined as a public 4 year degree granting institution
High School Drop-outs 17.3 ** 17.6 16.2 ** 15.1
High School Graduates 33.6 27.2 51.3 43.5
University Enrollees 49.1 55.2 32.5 41.4         
Access is defined as a public 2 or 4 year degree granting institution           
High School Drop-outs 17.3 * 17.5 14.8 *** 16.4
High School Graduates 33.2 28.4 52.4 43.9
University Enrollees 49.5 54.1 32.8 39.8
The access measure in the drop-out/graduate cut point is positive and significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) or 
10% (*) level.Table A7. OLS Regression  -  Dependent Variable: KWW Score
           Drop-outs       H.S. Graduates   University Enrollees
  Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error Coef. St. Error
Men
4 Year University in Labour Market 2.0691 1.2587 -0.8661 0.9202 1.1022 0.7246
Father's Education 0.3536 0.1895 0.1863 0.1578 0.3342 0.1072
Mother's Education 0.6160 0.2098 0.2567 0.1752 0.0884 0.1272
Immigrant Father -1.6441 3.2861 -5.4159 2.6759 3.5629 1.5198
Immigrant Mother 0.1282 3.5422 2.1311 2.8344 -3.7498 1.5391
Black Indicator -6.8778 1.1933 -7.1124 1.0758 -5.1671 0.8781
Number of Siblings -0.8831 0.1889 -0.4330 0.1655 -0.5268 0.1330
Newspaper* 2.4299 1.2275 1.8883 1.1786 4.0787 1.3259
Library Card* 2.2586 1.0660 3.7548 0.8972 3.4783 0.7739
Mom and Dad* -0.7696 1.3498 -0.2049 1.1995 0.8342 1.1078
1966 City Indicator 3.0375 1.3933 3.3805 1.1444 0.3004 0.8034
1966 Suburb Indicator 3.4442 1.4724 1.4444 1.0532 0.3238 0.7811   
N 680  973 1502  
R-Squared 0.3301  0.3041 0.3167
Women
4 Year University in Labour Market 1.1219 2.3139 0.8995 1.1580 0.3772 1.2555
Father's Education 0.1392 0.4183 0.4801 0.2047 0.2445 0.1954
Mother's Education 1.4414 0.3948 0.4674 0.2330 -0.0075 0.2425
Immigrant Father 2.0462 7.8226 -0.3536 3.7349 1.5053 2.6133
Immigrant Mother 2.2521 8.6559 -0.2330 3.4244 -4.2809 2.8783
Black Indicator -13.1031 2.3834 -11.0253 1.4031 -9.5452 1.6250
Number of Siblings -0.6250 0.3607 -0.7961 0.2204 -0.5726 0.2450
Newspaper* 3.7156 2.3988 3.7153 1.5385 -0.0537 2.4276
Library Card* 3.4674 2.2333 3.2916 1.1617 5.1898 1.5369
Mom and Dad* -2.0081 3.0416 -3.2900 1.6873 0.5395 2.1660
1968 City Indicator 2.9003 2.6894 0.6378 1.4114 1.5602 1.4490
1968 Suburb Indicator 4.3680 2.8689 1.4595 1.3226 -0.3174 1.3553
N 484  1248 863
R-Squared 0.2925  0.3308 0.2360
* These variables are household attributes at age 14.  All models also include 8 Census Division of residence at
age 14 dummy variables, 2 dummy variables for missing parental education data, 5 dummy variables for age, 
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